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THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL IN THE GRAND JURY ROOM
INTRODUCTION
Historically, the grand jury has had a dual function: to shield the individ-
ual from unfounded accusations,' and to serve as an investigative tool of the
government. 2 It is well embedded in the American criminal justice system and
indeed is one of the oldest institutions of Anglo-American civilization, with a
history of more than eight hundred years.3 Although its origins are somewhat
obscure, 4 the development of the grand jury is usually traced from the assize
of Clarendon, proclaimed by Henry II in 1 166. 5 By the end of the seventeenth
century, it was firmly established in England and was brought to this country
by the colonists. 6 With the birth of the nation the grand jury was incorporated
into the Bill of Rights.'
Despite its longevity, the grand jury has frequently come under attack. 8
Detractors have described it as "a relic of medievalism, cumbersome, slow,
inefficient, and costly."9 The grand jury has also been characterized as a
1. The grand jury "has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing
between the accuser and the accused ... to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason
or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will." Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); accord, Committee on Codes of the New York State Assembly, Abuse
of Power 23-24 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Abuse of Power]. Such protection is needed because
even if an accused is ultimately acquitted at trial, the issuance of an indictment can permanently
taint a person's reputation. See, e.g., Federal Grand Jury: Hearings on H.RJ. Res. 46, I.R.
1277 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 334, 338 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1976 House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
2. "The grand jury is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition,
the scope of whose powers of investigation and inquiries is not to be limited narrowly. . . ." Blair
v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). See generally Note, The Grand Jury as an
Investigatory Body, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1961); Note, The Grand Jury-Ilts Investigatory
Powers and Limitations, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 586 (1953).
3. For a full discussion of the history of the grand jury, see Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273, 279-83 (1919); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 301-07; L. Clark, The Grand Jury-The Use
and Abuse of Political Power 7-30 (1975); G. Edwards, The Grand Jury 1-44 (1906); Morse, A
Survey of the Grand Jury System (pt. 1), 10 Or. L. Rev. 101, 102-23 (1931). For a discussion of its
development in New York, see Note, Challenging New York Grand Jury Composition: The
Barrier of the "Systematic and Intentional Exclusion" Requirement, 6 Fordham Urb. L.J. 317,
318-19 (1978).
4. Morse, supra note 3, at 102-07.
5. Id. at 110; M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial 6 (1977).
6. M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 5, at 10; 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 87
(memorandum prepared by the Dep't of Justice).
7. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury
.U.S. Const. amend. V.
8. Among its more illustrious critics have been Jeremy Bentham, Robert Peel, Roscoe Pound,
Justice Felix Frankfurter, Raymond Moley, and former President and Chief Justice William
Howard Taft. M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 5, at 17.
9. Morse, supra note 3, at 101.
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rubber stamp of the prosecutor. 10 A number of states have eliminated the
requirement that criminal prosecutions be initiated by a grand jury." En-
gland abolished its grand jury requirement in 1933.12 Nevertheless, in both
the federal jurisdiction and in many states, the grand jury remains.' 3
Contemporary critics, focusing on such prosecutorial abuses in the grand
jury as intimidation and harassment of witnesses, unauthorized disclosures of
grand jury proceedings, and the collection of evidence for use against defen-
dants after they have been indicted,' 4 have called for basic reforms.' 5 In
particular, they point to the traditional rule, adopted by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and a majority of the states,' 6 that counsel is not allowed
inside the grand jury room for a witness who testifies before the grand jury.' 7
Although counsel is permitted outside the grand jury room under that
procedure, the witness must leave the room during questioning to consult
10. Id.
11. In 1859, Michigan became the first state to eliminate the requirement that criminal
prosecutions be initiated by a grand jury. M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 5, at 16.
Presently 29 states authorize prosecution by either information or indictment. Library of Congress
Study: State Grand Jury Practices, reprinted in 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 716 n.3. In
these states use of the grand jury is optional.
12. M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 5, at 16. For a survey of the circumstances
surrounding the abolition of the grand jury in England and a contrast to the situation in the
United States, see 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 90 (memorandum prepared by the Dep't
of Justice).
13. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6. The constitutional requirement of indictment by grand jury does not
extend to the individual states. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Nevertheless, although in some states discretion is left to the
prosecutor to initiate a prosecution by either information or indictment, in 21 states initiation of a
prosecution for a serious crime must be by indictment. Library of Congress Study. State Grand
Jury Practices (1976), reprinted in 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 717 n.4.
14. See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 415-87 (statements and material submitted by
Coalition to End Grand Jury Abuse); Abuse of Power, supra note 1, at 26-33 (collecting sources).
In 1973, Senator Kennedy compared the grand jury to a "Star Chamber secret inquisition." 1976
House Hearings, supra note 1, at 362.
15. E.g., L. Clark, supra note 3, at 110; M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, supra note 5, at 117-38;
Abuse of Power, supra note 1, at 82.
16. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976); Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d). Most
of the states that use the grand jury have no specific statutory provision allowing counsel inside
the grand jury, e.g., Idaho Code § 19-1111 (1979); La. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 433 (West Supp.
1979), and by negative implication counsel is kept out. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564, 581 (1976).
17. The traditional reason for the exclusion of counsel as well as other persons other than the
grand jurors, the government attorney, a stenographer, an interpreter (if necessary), and court
personnel is to ensure the secrecy of the proceeding. People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 423, 235
N.E.2d 439, 442, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 467, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968). But see Opinion of
the Justices for the Governor, -_ Mass. -, 371 N.E.2d 422 (1977). Reasons for maintaining the
secrecy of the grand jury include ensuring the grand jury the fullest opportunity to investigate
thoroughly, preventing the flight of an accused, preventing any tampering with witnesses, and
protecting the reputations of persons who are investigated but never indicted. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v.
Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628 (3d Cir. 1954); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2360 (rev. ed. J. ,McNaughton
1961).
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with him. 18 Responding to such criticism, twelve states, including New York,
have adopted procedures permitting some, if not all, witnesses to be accom-
panied by counsel inside the grand jury room. 19
In evaluating the effect of this change, it is important to realize that
although prosecutorial abuse may be widespread, the degree and type of
abuses may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 20 For instance, the New
York grand jury offers potential defendants and witnesses more protection
from prosecutorial abuse than the federal grand jury in four separate ways.
First, in New York, the rules of evidence for a grand jury are, with a few
exceptions, the same as trial rules of evidence. 2 1 The Federal Rules of
Evidence, however, are not applicable to the federal grand jury.22 Thus,
federal grand jurors can consider hearsay and other testimony not admissible
18. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976); United States v. Kopel, 552 F.2d
1265, 1271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Leighton, 265 F. Supp.
27, 38 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 386 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968); People
v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 423, 235 N.E.2d 439, 442, 238 N.Y.S.2d 462, 467, cert. denied, 393
U.S. 827 (1968).
19. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.6 (applicable to targets of investigation); Col. Rev. Stat.
§ 16-5-204(4)(d) (Supp. 1977) (applicable to all witnesses); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 112-4(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (applicable only if witness is a target of the investigation or has already
been indicted); Kan. Stat. § 22-3009 to -3010 (1975) (applicable to all witnesses); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 277, § 14A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978) (applicable to all witnesses); Mich. Comp.
Laws. Ann. § 767.19e (Supp. 1978) (applicable to witnesses granted immunity); Minn. R. Crim.
P. 18.04 (applicable if witness waives immunity); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.52 (McKinney
Supp. 1978-1979) (applicable if witness waives immunity'; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 340 (West
Supp. 1978) (applicable to all witnesses); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 23-30-7 (Supp. 1978) (effective
July 1, 1979) (applicable to all witnesses); Va. Code § 19.2-209 (1975) (applicable to all special
grand jury witnesses); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.28.120 (Supp. 1978) (applicable to all
witnesses unless immunity is granted). Congress has considered but has not passed, legislation to
allow counsel inside the federal grand jury. See H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and
International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 964, 982 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 House Hearings]; H.R. 2620, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977
House Hearings, supra, at 1023, 1031; H.R. 3150, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 House
Hearings, supra, at 1041, 1059-60; H.R. 3736, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 House
Hearings, supra, at 1072, 1087-88; H.R. 4908, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 House
Hearings, supra, at 1099, 1109-10; S. 1449, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 House
Hearings, supra, at 1149, 1163-64; H.R. 11660, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 545, 558; H.R. 10947, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1976
House Hearings, supra note 1, at 599; H.R. 1277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1976
House Hearings, supra note 1, at 532, 540; H.R. 6006, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), reprinted in
1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 569, 579.
20. For purposes of clarifying the analysis, this Note will focus on the federal and New York
grand juries. They will be used as prototypes of the different types of grand juries in the United
States. For a complete guide to the various state grand jury provisions, see Library of Congress
Study: State Grand Jury Practices (1976), reprinted in 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at
716-29.
21. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.30(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). The few exceptions
relate primarily to official documents such as autopsy, ballistic, and narcotic reports. Id. §
190.30(2); accord, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-918 (1977); Idaho Code § 19-1105 (1979).
22. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(2); accord, State v. Stallings, 25 Conn. Supp. 386, 206 A.2d 277
(Super. Ct. 1964); State v. Schroeder, 112 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1959).
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at trial. 23 Second, in New York, all persons arraigned on a felony charge are
notified of prospective or pending grand jury proceedings2 and all targets of
investigations have a right to appear and testify in their own behalf. 2s Under
federal law, a target of an investigation has no right to notice of a prospective
or pending grand jury proceeding and has no right to appear in his own
behalf. 26 Third, New York law, unlike the Federal Rules and a majority of
the states, permits an arrested defendant to recommend to the grand jury that
witnesses favorable to his position be called to testify, 27 a request that is
rarely denied.28 Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, there is a major
difference between the federal and New York rules as to grants of immunity
to grand jury witnesses. In the federal grand jury, there is no automatic
immunity for a witness who testifies before a grand jury. 2 9 Furthermore, even
if the government prosecutor decides to offer immunity to a particular
witness, only limited use immunity is available. 30 In New York, any witness
testifying before a grand jury is protected automatically with transactional 3'
23. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
24. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 100.50 (McKinney 1971).
25. Id.; accord, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 335 (West 1969).
26. United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 423 U.S. 861
(1975); United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604, 605-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 790 (1944); accord, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-412 (1975).
27. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.50(6) (McKinney 1971).
28. Proposed Grand Jury Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomin. on Criminal Justice of the
Committee on Codes, New York Assembly 200th Sess. 60 (1977) (unpublished transcript in Codes
Committee Office, New York City) [hereinafter cited as New York Hearings] (statement of Special
Prosecutor Keenan).
29. Immunity is received only if the witness, asserting his self-incrimination privilege, refuses
to testify and the United States Attorney obtains a court order directing the wvitness to testify. 18
U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976). This is the procedure in the vast majority of states that grant
immunity to grand jury witnesses. E.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1324 (West Supp. 1979); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 11, § 3506 (1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.27.130 (Supp. 1978).
30. Under a grant of use immunity any information directly or indirectly derived from the
witness' testimony may not be used against the witness in any criminal case except for a
prosecution for perjury. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). The government may still prosecute the
witness, however, based upon evidence gathered independently of the witness' testimony. In
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Supreme Court ruled that such limited
immunity is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and is sufficient
to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.
31. N.Y. Crim. Prac. Law §§ 50.10, 190.40 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1978-1979). Under a
grant of automatic transactional immunity any witness, even without asking for it, is protected
from any prosecution for the transaction to which he testified. Transactional immunity offers the
witness greater protection than use immunity and is, therefore, more desirable to the witness. The
prosecutor, on the other hand, prefers use immunity. First, under a grant of use immunity more
information is likely to be obtained from a witness than under a grant of transactional immunity.
A witness with transactional immunity will often relate just enough information so that immunity
will attach. He may then become evasive and not divulge any more information of substance. In
contrast, a witness with use immunity has a strong incentive to disclose as much information as
possible because the government will be precluded from using that information in a prosecution
against him. Second, under a grant of use immunity the witness may still be prosecuted as to the
transaction which was the subject of his testimony if a prosecution can be based on independent
evidence. Consequently, although a prosecutor may be reluctant to have a witness testify under a
transactional immunity grant for fear of the possibility of subsequently discovering independent
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immunity unless he affirmatively waives this protection. 32 Consequently,
unless immunity is granted, a federal grand jury witness has to be on guard
against making damaging self-incriminating statements; in New York, the
witness is free from this concern. The New York statute permitting counsel
inside the room, however, applies only to witnesses who waive their immu-
nity. 3
3
Nevertheless, both in New York and in those states that have adopted
similiar legislation, the practice of allowing counsel inside the room is a
departure from traditional grand jury procedure. This Note will examine the
need for this new rule of law. Part I will demonstrate, by analyzing both the
role of the grand jury and the right to counsel arising under the fifth and sixth
amendments, that a witness does not have a constitutional right to be
accompanied by counsel inside the grand jury room. Part II will show that,
notwithstanding the absence of a constitutional right, a balancing of conflict-
ing policy considerations dictates that counsel be permitted inside the grand
jury when the witness is not protected by immunity. Finally, Part III will
examine anticipated problems under the New York statute in light of prior
case law, the experience of other states, and the legislative history of the new
statute.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS
A constitutional right to counsel at various pretrial proceedings has been
recognized by the Supreme Court on two separate grounds. First, a sixth
amendment 34 right to counsel exists when the absence of counsel might
derogate from the accused's ability to have a fair trial. 35 Thus, for example, in
United States v. Wade, 36 the Court recognized a right to counsel at a
post-indictment lineup identification. 3 7 Second, a right to counsel exists when
the accused needs the guidance of counsel to protect his fifth amendment
self-incrimination privilege. 3 8 The right emanates from the landmark decision
evidence and not being able to use it, no such fear is present with a grant of use immunity.
Memorandum (No. 595, Supp. 1) from Assistant Attorney General Wilson to United States
Attorneys (Sept. 2, 1971), reprinted in 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 154-55.
32. Immunity may be waived pursuant to N.Y. Crim Proc. Law § 190.45 (McKinney 1971 &
Supp. 1978-1979), which provides that the waiver must be a written document subscribed by and
sworn to by the witness. In order to ensure that the witness knowingly waives his right the statute
requires that the witness be allowed to consult with counsel before executing the waiver and that
the district attorney advise him of this right. Id.
33. Id. § 190.52 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
34. The sixth amendment in pertinent part provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const.
amend. VI. This guarantee, as incorporated by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, also applies to state prosecutions. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1962);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-68 (1932).
35. E.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52, 54 (1961); see Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
36. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
37. Id. at 226-27.
38. The right to counsel at certain pretrial stages to protect against self-incrimination "is
indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 469 (1966).
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of Miranda v. Arizona39 in which the Court held that a defendant is entitled
to the assistance of counsel at a custodial police station interrogation.
40
In the context of the grand jury, neither ground mandates the presence of
counsel inside the grand jury room. Indeed, the sixth amendment requirement
of protection of a fair trial does not require that a witness before a grand jury
be aided by counsel even outside the grand jury room. 4' The protection of the
self-incrimination privilege requires the presence of counsel only when the
witness testifying is not protected by a grant of immunity. Nevertheless,
counsel need only be outside the grand jury room to satisfy the constitutional
requirement. 42
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court has never specifically ruled whether a witness before a
grand jury has a constitutional right to have counsel either inside or outside
the grand jury room. 43 The Court in In re Groban ,4' however, did state in
dictum that a witness "before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of
constitutional right on being represented by his counsel. ' '4- The Court had an
opportunity to reconsider the Groban dictum in United States v. Man-
dujano.46 In Mandujano, the Court addressed the applicability of Miranda
warnings to grand jury witnesses." Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
plurality, in dicta, denied any constitutional right to counsel at the grand jury
stage.4 8 He cited Kirby v. Illinois,4 9 in which the Court held that there is no
39. 384 U.s. 436 (1966).
40. Id. at 466.
41. See pt. H(A) infra.
42. See pt. 1(B) infra.
43. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 603 (1975) (Brennan, J.. concurring).
44. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
45. Id. at 333. Justice Reed's opinion does not discuss the issue. Instead, he relies on prior
lower court decisions. Id. at 333 n.5 (citing United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.
1955); In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.
Mo. 1948).
46. 425 U.S. 564 (1976). With the judicial expansion of the right to counsel to custodial police
interrogations, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); preliminary hearings, Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); and post-indictment lineup identifications, United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), one would have expected that the
Court's dictum in Groban would have been rejected by the late sixties or early seventies. Legal
scholars vehemently argued the inconsistency of affording the accused a right to counsel in police
interrogations and preliminary hearings and yet denying that very same right to a witness
appearing before a grand jury. See, e.g., Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stagel, 10
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 807 (1972) (relying on Coleman); Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand
Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189 (1966) (relying on Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)). Yet courts
during that period consistently refused to pierce the barrier of the seemingly antiquated dictum of
the Groban decision. E.g., United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.), ccii. denied, 412 U.S.
954 (1973); United States v. Daniels, 461 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. George, 444
F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Corralo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 958 (1969). The one exception was Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1967),
re-v'd on other grounds, 415 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1969).
47. 425 U.S. at 578-80.
48. Id. at 580-81.
49. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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sixth amendment right to counsel to protect a fair trial at a police station
lineup identification made prior to the commencement of criminal proceed-
ings, 50 and argued that, similarly, the grand jury is too early in the criminal
justice process for a constitutional right to counsel to attach. 5 1
A review of Kirby, however, reveals that the Chief Justice's analysis may
have been incorrect. Kirby involved a lineup which was conducted a few
hours after the accused was arrested.5 2 In denying the accused a right to
counsel at the lineup, the Court reasoned that at the time of the lineup no
formal criminal proceeding had been initiated against him; consequently, he
had no right to counsel.5 3 The Court distinguished other cases recognizing a
right to counsel at certain pretrial proceedings by stating that "all of those
cases have involved points of time at or after the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, [or] indictment . . . .,4
Applying this standard, a right to counsel in the grand jury cannot be
denied as being too early in the judicial process. In many cases, a defendant
appears before a grand jury after he has attended a preliminary arraignment
or a preliminary hearing.-s In these situations, the grand jury proceeding
takes place after the initiation of formal criminal proceedings. The Court has
explicitly stated that a preliminary hearing initiates the judicial process.
5 6
Although it has not ruled definitively on the issue, the Court has also very
strongly suggested that a preliminary arraignment initiates the judicial pro-
cess. 5 7 Furthermore, the criteria outlined in Kirby indicate that a preliminary
arraignment initiates the judicial process. In Kirby, the Court stated that
criminal proceedings are initiated when the government commits itself to
prosecute."8 At this point, the adverse positions of the government and
defendant are solidified, and the defendant is immersed in the intricacies of
50. Id. at 684.
51. "No criminal proceedings had been instituted against respondent, hence the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had not come into play." 425 U.S. at 581.
52. 406 U.S. at 684-85.
53. Id. at 690.
54. Id. at 689 (emphasis added). In Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 228 (1977), the Court
explicitly stated that Kirby does not exclude a sixth amendment right to counsel in all
pre-indictment stages.
55. This is the case when a person has been arrested on a felony charge. After the arrest he
must be taken, without unneccessary delay, to a magistrate for a preliminary arraignment where
a complaint is filed showing probable cause for the arrest. At that time he is advised of his rights
and bail is set. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 180.10 (McKinney 1971). Under
federal law, after this preliminary arraignment, the accu;ed is entitled to a preliminary hearing
within a specified time unless he is indicted by a grand jury before that time. Fed. R. Crim. P.
5(c). In New York, the accused is entitled to a preliminary hearing to determine if the evidence
warrants his being held over for the grand jury. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 180.10(2), .70(1)
(McKinney 1971).
56. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 689; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
57. Brewer v. Illinois, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977). In Brewer, a warrant had been issued for
defendant's arrest and he had been arraigned and committed to jail. The Court held that judicial
proceedings had been initiated and a right to counsel attached. Id.
58. 406 U.S. at 689.
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substantive and procedural law. 9 The preliminary arraignment meets this
description. First, a charging instrument is filed 60 indicating the government's
intent to prosecute. Second, questions of law arise at this stage because bail is
set and the accused is advised of his rights.6 1 Consequently, if a grand jury is
preceded by a preliminary arraignment or preliminary hearing, the grand jury
proceeding occurs after the initiation of formal criminal proceedings.
Even when it is not preceded by a preliminary arraignment or preliminary
hearing, 62 the grand jury itself is the step at which the formal judicial process
is initiated. At the grand jury, the public prosecutor presents evidence against
the target of the investigation. 63 Thus, the "prosecutorial forces of organized
society"64 are directed at the putative defendant. This, according to Kirby, is
one of the marks of the initiation of criminal proceedings. 65 The grand jury is
also similar to the preliminary hearing-a step already recognized as initiating
criminal proceedings 6 6-- because the trier of fact focuses on the target of the
investigation to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the
accused has committed the alleged crime.67 Thus, even when the grand jury
is not preceded by a prior hearing, the grand jury is not too early for a sixth
amendment right to counsel to attach.
Nevertheless, even if Kirby's commencement of criminal proceedings test is
satisfied in the case of a grand jury, the sixth amendment does not require
that all witnesses who testify at a grand jury be assisted by counsel either
inside or outside the room. First, the right to counsel, if it were to exist,
would be limited to putative defendants. It is the accused who requires "the
guiding hand of counsel."'68 Only those witnesses who are targets of the
investigation would have a colorable claim to be represented by counsel at the
proceedings.
Second, and more fundamentally, the sixth amendment right to counsel at
pretrial proceedings is directed towards preserving a fair trial rather than a
fair pretrial proceeding. 69 The Court has recognized that events at critical
stages in the criminal process may reduce the possibility of a fair trial, and
thus affect the ultimate fate of the accused.70 This does not mean, however,
59. Id.
60. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 180.10(1) (McKinney 1971).
61. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 180.10(4), (6) (McKinney 1971).
62. A grand jury can investigate a crime even when no arrests have yet been made, e.g.,
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.55(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979), in which case it is preceded by
neither an arraignment nor a preliminary hearing.
63. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.55 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1978-1979).
64. 406 U.S. at 689.
65. Id.
66. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
67. Compare N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 180.70(1) (McKinney 1971) with id. § 190.65(1).
68. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69
(1932)); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
69. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court stated that "the accused is
guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution ...
where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial." Id. at 226
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
70. E.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (right to counsel exists at Alabama
arraignment because only then may the defense of insanity be pleaded).
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that the right to counsel attaches to all pretrial proceedings. The assistance of
counsel is limited to those situations where absence of counsel may substan-
tially and irreparably damage the putative defendant's right to have a fair
trial and where adequate alternative means of protecting that right do not
exist. In United States v. Wade, 7 1 the Court emphasized that absence of
counsel at a post-indictment lineup may result in an altogether unreliable
identification "which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair
trial."'7 2 In the police station, absent the assistance of counsel, any type of
irregularity may pass unnoticed or even be concealed.7 3 The Court in Wade
specifically mentioned that had there been sufficient alternative safeguards,
the presence of counsel would not have been required.7 4
Conditions inside a police station, however, differ radically from those
inside a grand jury. In the grand jury, impartial jurors who observe and
weigh the events are available afterwards to report any irregularities to the
court.7 S Indeed, the mere presence of a group of unbiased outsiders acts as a
bulwark against prosecutorial abuse and helps preserve the fairness of the
proceeding and in turn the fairness of the trial. 76 In many jurisdictions the
entire grand jury proceeding is transcribed and subject to judicial review. In
New York, for example, a sworn stenographer is present inside the grand jury
and supplies the court with a verbatim transcript of the testimony and
statements made by the grand jurors and by the prosecutor. 77 On the federal
level, many courts, realizing the importance of a record, require a transcript
of the proceedings despite the absence of any statutory requirement. 78 Under
71. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
72. Id. at 228.
73. Id. at 230-32.
74. Id. at 239, cited in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 347 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting).
76. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579-80 (1976); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330,
347 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the coercive atmosphere in the grand jury
room, see Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 160-62.
77. Pursuant to N.Y. Jud. Law § 325 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979), a stenographer is
required to transcribe all testimony introduced before a grand jury. Furthermore, any legal
instructions or advice from the court or prosecutor must be recorded in the grand jury minutes.
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.25(6) (McKinney 1971). Failure to record legal instructions given to
the grand jury by the prosecutor results in dismissal of the indictment if the defendant is
prejudiced by the failure. People v. Percy, 45 A.D.2d 284, 358 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1974) (per curiam),
aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 806, 345 N.E.2d 582, 382 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975); see New York Hearings, supra
note 28, at 60 (statement of Special Prosecutor Keenan). Deliberations of the grand jury are not
recorded.
78. In the Southern District of New York, for example, grand jury stenographers record
every word spoken while a witness is present in the grand jury room. United States v. Messitte,
324 F. Supp. 334, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Such a procedure is not required by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 6(d) of the Rules provides that "a stenographer . . . may be present
while the grand jury is in session." (emphasis added) Courts have frequently noted that although
it is highly desirable to transcribe grand jury minutes, there is no such federal requirement.
United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 988 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134,
1142 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Peden, 472 F.2d 583, 584 (2d
Cir. 1973) (per curiam). H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 House Hearings, supra
note 19, at 988-89, would have changed the rule by requiring the recording of grand jury
proceedings. Id. § 3333.
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both New York and federal law, prosecutorial unfairness and irregularities
can be the subject of pretrial motions to dismiss an indictment. 79 Further-
more, even if an indictment is induced by prosecutorial abuse and is not
dismissed on motion, the accused may still have a fair trial. In preparation for
trial he can obtain a transcript of his own grand jury testimony.80 At the trial,
if the government introduces a witness who testified at the grand jury, the
defendant can obtain a transcript of that witness' grand jury testimony in
order to cross-examine the witness effectively. 8' Consequently, the role which
counsel could serve in preserving a fair trial by merely being present at the
grand jury proceedings is adequately fulfilled by other means.
Counsel's assumption of an active role in the grand jury, on the other hand,
would radically alter the character of the proceedings. Historically, both in
England and in the United States, the grand jury has been an investigatory
rather than adversarial institution. 82 Hence the accused is not allowed to
cross-examine witnesses, raise objections, or question witnesses favorable to
his own position. 83 Because the grand jury is not adversarial, the accused
79. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.20(11(c) (McKinney 1971).
80. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1XA) provides: "Upon request of a defendant the government
shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph . . recorded testimony of the
defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged." The courts have disagreed
whether this creates an absolute right or whether this rule vests discretion in the court to require
the defendant to show why he needs the material. Compare United States v. Tobin Packing Co.,
362 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (absolute right) and United States v. Tanner, 279 F.
Supp. 457, 472 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (same) with United States v. Jones, 374 F.2d 414, 420 (2d Cir.)
(discretion in court), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 835 (1967). See generally C. Wright, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Criminal § 108 (1969 & Supp. 1978). In New York, upon motion by the
defendant, the court must issue an order of discovery with respect to the testimony of the
defendant before the grand jury. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 240.20(1)(a) (McKinney 1971).
Defendant is entitled to a copy of his testimony even if it has nothing to do with the charges
contained in the pending indictment. People v. Fitzgerald, 89 Misc. 2d 243, 243, 391 N.Y.S.2d
322, 323 (1977).
81. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870-72 (1966); see 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). In the
Second Circuit, the defendant is entitled to see the grand jury testimony of each witness on the
subject which he testified to at trial even without a showing of need. United States v.
Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 1967). The Seventh Circuit also follows this approach.
United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971). Other
courts require a showing of need. United States v. Wallace. 528 F.2d 863, 865 (4th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Hensley, 374 F.2d 341, 352-53 (6th Cir.), cert. denied. 388 U.S. 923 (19671. In
New York, defendant's right to inspect, and to use on cross-examination, the grand jury
testimony of a prosecutions' witness derives from People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d
881, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 866 (1961). In Rosario, the court held that
defendant is entitled to use, for impeachment purposes, prior statements made by the witness
relating to the subject matter of the testimony. Grand jury minutes have been held to be such
prior statements. People v. Jaglom, 17 N.Y.2d 162, 164, 216 N.E.2d 576, 577, 269 N.Y.S.2d
406, 407 (1966).
82. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-44 (1974); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273, 280-82 (1919); see Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359. 361-63 (1956).
83. Even in New York which permits the defendant to suggest to the grand jury that a
witness favorable to his position be called to testify, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.50(6)
(McKinney 1971), the defendant does nothing more than make the suggestion. He does not go
inside the grand jury with the witness and indeed he may not be sure that the witness actually
gave testimony favorable to his own position. See People v. Washington, 84 Misc. 2d 935, 377
N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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does not suffer from not being assisted by counsel.1 4
B. Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court has held that a right to counsel in certain pretrial
proceedings may attach when the accused needs protection from making
self-incriminating statements.8 5  Despite the possibility that the self-
incrimination privilege may be implicated in the grand jury, Chief Justice
Burger argued in Mandujano that, based upon Kirby, no right to counsel
attaches at the grand jury stage.8 6 A review of Kirby, however, contradicts
this contention. As Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Mandujano points
out,8 7 the Court reached its decision in Kirby after explicitly recognizing that
in the case of a lineup, the accused's self-incrimination privilege is not
implicated.88 The Kirby Court had noted, however, that when the accused
needs assistance in protecting his self-incrimination privilege, he has a right to
counsel at any critical stage of the case, no matter how early that may be.8 9
Therefore, an arrested person has a right to counsel at custodial police station
interrogations."0 Similarly, Justice Brennan concluded, because grand jury
proceedings may implicate the self-incrimination privilege, a right to counsel
cannot be denied as being too early in the criminal judicial process. 9 '
The mere fact, however, that Kirby would not preclude the fifth amend-
ment right to counsel in the grand jury to protect against self-incrimination,
does not necessarily mean that a right to counsel exists. In New York, where
all grand jury witnesses are automatically granted immunity unless they
affirmatively waive it,9 2 the grant sufficiently satisfies the constitutional
guaranty of protection against self-incrimination. 9 3 Because the grant of
immunity is self-executing, the witness does not need counsel to assert his
right. Therefore, in New York, where there is no danger of self-incrimination
unless the witness waives his immunity,9 4 the fifth amendment would not
require the presence of counsel either inside or outside the grand jury room.
84. If a pretrial proceeding is adversarial, the accused has much to lose by not being
represented by counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969) (preliminary hearing), For
instance, at a preliminary hearing, he needs counsel to "freeze" the testimony of prosecution
witnesses, obtain discovery of the prosecution's case, and argue the lack of probable cause. See
Dash, supra note 46, at 815. But given the nonadversarial posture of the grand jury proceeding In
which counsel, even if he was present, could not perform these functions, a putative defendant's
ability to procure a fair trial does not suffer because he is denied a right to counsel.
85. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
86. 425 U.S. at 581.
87. Id. at 602 (Brennan, J., concurring).
88. 406 U.S. at 687.
89. Id. at 688 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
90. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966). In a police station interrogation the
self-incrimination privilege cannot be secured by either the admonishment of the prosecutor or by
the preliminary advice from counsel. Id. at 469-70.
91. 425 U.S. at 604-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
93. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448 (1972); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595
(1896). In Kastigar, the Court ruled that even use immunity is coextensiye with the self-
incrimination privilege.
94. If the witness waives immunity, then his constitutional rights should be the same as a
witness in a federal grand jury prior to a grant of immunity. See notes 95-109 itfra and
accompanying text.
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In the federal jurisdiction and in those states where immunity is not
automatically granted95 and the prosecutor decides not to procure a grant, the
self-incrimination privilege may be implicated. At first blush, therefore, the
witness should have a constitutional right to be assisted by counsel. Although
a grand jury room has a less coercive atmosphere than a police station, 96 the
witness needs the aid of counsel to guide him as to the parameters of the
self-incrimination privilege. As Chief Justice Burger has recognized, a
"layman may not be aware of the precise scope, the nuances, and the
boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege.1 97 Because under federal law
the self-incrimination privilege is not self-executing, and can be lost by not
asserting it in a timely fashion, the witness should be entitled to the aid of
counsel. 98
Nevertheless, as Justice Brennan recognizes in Mandujano, merely because
the self-incrimination privilege may be implicated does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that there is a constitutional right to counsel inside the grand
jury room. 99 In the vast majority of instances, the witness would be at no
disadvantage with respect to his fifth amendment right by consulting with his
attorney outside rather than inside the grand jury room. If during his
testimony the witness realizes the possibility that a fifth amendment privilege
may be applicable, he does not suffer by having counsel outside the room. He
can leave the room and discover if the privilege should be asserted.10 0 If the
witness has difficulty relating his unprofessional recollection of the question to
the attorney or if he finds it difficult to remember his attorney's instruc-
tions, 10 1 the situation could be remedied by allowing the witness to take notes
of the question and his attorney's instructions.
It is only in the limited situation where the witness does not recognize the
possibility that the self-incrimination privilege can be asserted that he is at a
95. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
97. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975), quoted in United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. at 604 (Brennan, J., concurring).
98. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 604-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 605 (Brennan, J., concurring).
100. Although it is possible that a witness may be reluctant to leave the room because of other
considerations, see note 122 infra and accompanying text, he may leave if he wants. Thus, the
constitutional requirement has been met. Typically, permission to leave the room is freely granted
and some witnesses take frequent advantage of it. E.g., United States v. George, 444 F.2d 310,
315 (6th Cir. 1971) (witness "had right to consult with his attorney after every question"); United
States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743, 745 (9th Cir. 1971) (some witnesses conferred with counsel
"after almost every question"); see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 606 n.23 (Brennan,
J., concurring). In the few cases where the court has sanctioned limiting the times a witness may
leave the room to consult with his counsel, it was clear to the court that the witness was not
leaving the room to receive legal advice as to the self-incrimination privilege. In In re Tierney,
465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972), the court ruled that it is proper to limit the number of times a
witness leaves the room when the witness makes frequent departures for frivolous reasons with
intent to frustrate the proceedings. In a leading New York case prior to the statutory change,
People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, cerl. denied, 393 U.S.
827 (1968), the court held that it was proper to limit a witness' departures from the room when it
was clear that he wanted help in answering embarrassing questions. See notes 147-49 infra and
accompanying text.
101. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proc. § 340.3, Commentary at 602-03 (1975).
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disadvantage in not having counsel inside the room. This situation, could
arise if the witness, totally unfamiliar with the self-incrimination privilege
or under the pressure of the questioning, becomes agitated and forgets
that he can, and should, leave the room to get legal advice from his attorney.
Thus, he may testify when he could have remained silent.
Notwithstanding the possibility that such a situation may arise, two consid-
erations warrant the conclusion that a constitutional right to counsel at the
grand jury stage would be fulfilled by allowing counsel to be available outside
the grand jury room. First, prior to the grand jury appearance, counsel can
teach his client the basics of the self-incrimination privilege. It is not neces-
sary that the witness understand the exact parameters of the privilege; it is
sufficient if he merely recognizes that the privilege might be available. 102
Second, the extent of the procedures adopted to protect the self-
incrimination privilege must be balanced against the traditional role of the
grand jury as a secret, investigative body. 10 3 The right to counsel in pretrial
proceedings is not explicit in the Constitution, but derives from the fifth
amendment. Even in Miranda v. Arizona, 10 4 the high water mark of fifth
amendment protection, 05 the Court recognized that the right to counsel was
not absolute by stating that alternative safeguards may be developed to
protect the fifth amendment privilege.' 0 6
The tradition of secrecy in the grand jury on the other hand, a policy "older
than our Nation itself,"' 0 7 has legitimately become to be recognized as
"indispensable."' 0 8 Upsetting the secrecy of the proceedings is tantamount to
tampering with the very essence of the grand jury. The secrecy of the grand
jury must remain inviolate in order to facilitate full investigations, to prevent
102. Counsel does not have to teach his client all the details of the privilege because the client
can consult further with his attorney outside the grand jury room when the client suspects that he
should assert his privilege. Thus although Meshbesher, supra note 46, at 202-03, is correct in
asserting that Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), makes it clear that a person's consulta-
tion with counsel at some stage prior to his questioning is insufficient to protect the self-
incrimination privilege, his conclusion that the witness must consult with counsel inside the grand
jury room during the questioning is incorrect. Counsel's instruction before the proceeding plus his
availability outside the room during the proceeding substantially protects the self-incrimination
privilege. An additional requirement, that the prosecutor advise the witness as to his rights,
would also contribute to the witness' understanding of the privilege. See United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 605 (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. In United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821, 824 (2,1 Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
989 (1969), cited in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 605 (Brennan, J., concurring), the
court said that "the rule under which [a witness is] free to leave the grand jury room at any time
to consult with counsel is a reasonable and workable accommodation of the traditional investiga-
tory role of the grand jury, preserved in the Fifth Amendment, and the self-incrimination and
right to counsel provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."
104. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
105. The Burger Court has severely limited Miranda. E.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1973);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see Stone, supra note 76, at 160-62.
106. 384 U.S. at 436.
107. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959).
108. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943). But see Dash, supra note 46, at
818-24.
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the flight of the accused, to prevent tampering with witnesses, and to protect
the reputations of persons who are investigated but not indicted. 0 9 Allowing
counsel inside the room creates a possible leak in the grand jury's secrecy. In
light of this possible damage to the grand jury, the derivative right to counsel
to protect against self-incrimination is satisfied by the traditional procedure of
permitting counsel to be available to the witness outside the room.
In summary, arguments for the existence of a constitutional right to consult
with counsel inside the grand jury room are not persuasive. The defendant's
right to a fair trial is adequately ensured by other procedures such as the
transcription of grand jury minutes and judicial review of the grand jury
proceedings. Protection of the self-incrimination privilege is accomplished
either, as in New York, by providing automatic immunity to witnesses, or, as
in federal jurisdiction, by allowing the witness to consult with counsel outside
the grand jury room.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although there is no constitutional right to counsel inside the grand jury
room, considerations of policy dictate that in limited situations counsel should
accompany a witness into the room. As was noted earlier,"10 the grand jury
fulfills two quite different roles. It shields the individual from unfounded
government accusations and is a governmental tool in conducting effective
investigation. In the context of a right to counsel inside the grand jury, these
differences become pronounced.
In the grand jury, the public prosecutor has enormous powers. As legal
advisor to the jurors he may place evidence before them,''' summarize it, 112
charge the jury as to applicable law' 3 and ask for an indictment." 4 In his
quest for an indictment, however, a prosecutor may take advantage of his
position by harassing and intimidating witnesses." I Such prosecutorial over-
reaching may result in the issuance of an unfounded indictment, which, even if
eventually dismissed, might cause irreparable harm to the person accused.1t 6
Because the grand jury functions as a guardian of the rights of the individual,
such a result is at variance with the purpose of the institution itself. Although
these abuses do not deprive the defendant of a fair trial and thus do not call
109. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628 (3d Cir. 19541. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 17,
§ 2360.
110. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
111. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.55 (McKinney 1971).
112. In re Kelley, 83 Misc. 2d 776, 781, 372 N.Y.S.2d 538, 544 (Suffolk County Ct. 1975).
113. Id. at 781; 372 N.Y.S.2d at 544; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 190.25(6). .30 (McKinney
1971 & Supp. 1978-1979).
114. In re Kelley, 83 Misc. 2d 776, 781, 372 N.Y.S.2d 538. 544 (Suffolk County Ct. 1975).
115. E.g., United States v. Whitted, 325 F. Supp. 520 (D. Neb. 1971), re,'d, 454 F 2d 642
(8th Cir. 1972) (defendant was subjected to a prejudicial inquisition into his life and conduct with
reference to matters not relevant to the grand jury inquiry); United States v. DiGrazia, 213 F.
Supp. 232 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (defendant was asked clearly prejudicial questions calculated to
impugn her in the eyes of the grand jury); see 1976 House Hearings. supra note 1. at 378-514
(statement and materials submitted by Coalition to End Grand Jury Abuse).
116. 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 334, 338 (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
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for a constitutional right to counsel, they nevertheless represent a defect in the
current procedure that should be corrected. The presence of counsel inside the
grand jury would stand as a bulwark against abuses of the grand jury
system. "1
7
The constitutional protection against self-incrimination is fulfilled by allow-
ing the witness to leave the room and consult with counsel outside. Optimally,
however, to assist the witness in making legal decisions that do not endanger
the loss of constitutional rights, counsel should be permitted inside the grand
jury room. In New York, where the rules of evidence apply to grand
juries,'' 8 the witness, without counsel by his side, might reply to irrelevant
questions, or questions that require him to divulge privileged communica-
tions." 9 The witness with immunity before either the New York or federal
grand jury may not realize that it does not protect him from a perjury
prosecution.' 20 In the federal jurisdiction, the witness may need counsel's
assistance to understand the nuances of the use immunity.' 2 1 Furthermore,
requiring the witness to leave the room to confer with his attorney may harm
the witness' credibility in the eyes of the grand jurors. 122
Although opponents of the presence of counsel in the grand jury room
minimize the problems inherent in keeping counsel outside the grand jury
room,' 23 they do not deny that the witness would be better protected if
counsel were permitted inside. 124 Nevertheless, they argue that the benefits of
permitting counsel inside the room are clearly outweighed by the damaging
effects that counsel's presence in the room would have on the grand jury's
capacity to conduct effective investigations. 125 :Because it is an investigative
117. This argument has been made frequently. E.g., 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at
177 (statement of the ABA); 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 627 (report of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York); New York Hearings, supra note 28, at 183 (statement of
William Gallagher of the New York City Legal Aid Society).
118. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.30(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
119. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proc. § 340.3, Commentary at 603 (1975).
120. The federal immunity statute specifically states that the grant of immunity does not
protect against a perjury prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). In New York, all grand jury
witnesses can be prosecuted for perjury. People v. Tomasello, 21 N.Y.2d 143, 234 N.E.2d 190,
287 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
121. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
122. The prejudicial effect of leaving the room is widely recognized. E.g., ABA Report to
House of Delegates on Grand Jury Reform, reprinted in 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at
176. Watergate Special Prosecutor Charles Ruff has stated that prosecutors count on this
prejudical effect to dissuade witnesses from asserting their right to counsel. Id. at 3. But see id. at
236 (statement by Judge Lacey, representing the Judicial Conference of the United States).
123. E.g., Letter from Circuit Judges Mansfield, Mulligan, Timbers, Gurfein, Van
Graafeiland, and Meskill to Rep. Eilberg (Aug. 2, 1977), reprinted in 1977 House Hearings,
supra note 19, at 261; New York Hearings, supra note 28, at 235 (statement of Paul Curran,
former United States Attorney).
124. E.g., Silbert, Defense Counsel in the Grand Jury-The Answer to the White Collar
Criminal's Prayers, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 293, 295-96 (1973); Statement of Philip B. Heymann,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Dep't of Justice, before the Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure, Senate Judiciary Committee, at 25 (Aug. 22, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Heymann Statement].
125. Silbert, supra note 124, at 295-96; Heymann Statement, supra note 124, at 25. Implicit in
this view is that the primary role of the grand jury is to investigate. The Department of Justice
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tool of the government, a grand jury is substantially hampered by having
counsel inside the room advising the witness. With counsel at the witness'
side, a real possibility is created that the witness will reply to questioning by
parroting responses formulated by counsel. 12
6
Furthermore, the presence of counsel could in certain situations have an
inhibiting effect on the witness who does respond in his own words. Not
infrequently, particularly in investigations of organized crime, business fraud,
union corruption, antitrust violations, and other white collar offenses, one
attorney represents more than just one witness. Although a witness may
desire to cooperate with the government, he may be reluctant to answer fully
if he knows that a mobster, an employer, fellow union members, or others
whom his attorney represents will discover that he has testified against
them. 127
If counsel, unwittingly or otherwise, leaks the witness' testimony to a
putative defendant, two additional obstacles to effective grand jury investiga-
tion are created. First, if a putative defendant finds out about damaging
testimony, he may be able to orchestrate a defense. 2 8 Second, the prospective
defendant may take reprisals against the witness who has testified against
him. 129 Although this may be more likely to occur in cases of multiple
representation, an attorney leaking the substance of the testimony of his one
client could produce similar results.
These problems exist to some degree even when counsel does not enter the
grand jury room.1 3 0 They are aggravated, however, if the attorney is actually
underscores this role by pointing out that the grand jury alone has plenary investigative powers
beyond those possessed by police, prosecutors, magistrates, administrative bodies, and legislative
committees. 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 88-89.
126. Heymann Statement, supra note 124, at 22. For similar reasons a defendant in a criminal
trial normally is not allowed to consult with counsel once he takes the stand. Id.
127. The problem of multiple representation is uniformly recognized. E.g., 1977 House
Hearings, supra note 19, at 287 (statement of Edwin Miller, representing National District
Attorneys Ass'n), 724 (statement of Benjamin Civiletti, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Dep't of Justice); ABA Report to the House of Delegates on Grand Jury Reform (Aug.
9, 1977), reprinted in 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 177. There is debate, however, as
to whether the problem of multiple representation justifies the refusal to allow any witness to
bring counsel into the grand jury room. The overwhelming majority of prosecutors think that it
does. E.g., 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 287 (statement of Edwin Miller, representing
National District Attorneys Ass'n), 724 n.22 (statement of Benjamin Civiletti, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, Dep't of Justice). Advocates of allowing counsel into the room argue
that there are alternative methods of coping with the problem, that the problem will not be
appreciably aggravated by allowing counsel in, and that the problem affects only a relatively
small number of grand jury proceedings. Id. at 272 (statement of Charles Ruff, Watergate Special
Prosecutor); New York Hearings, supra note 28, at 180 (statement of William Gallagher,
representing New York City Legal Aid Society).
128. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 287 (statement of Edwin Miller, representing
National District Attorneys Ass'n).
129. New York Hearings, supra note 28, at 65 (statement of Robert Morgenthau, District
Attorney of Manhattan).
130. Even if counsel does not enter the room but merely waits for the witness outside, he may
be able to detect if the witness cooperated with the government by noting how long the witness
was inside testifying or by talking with him after the grand jury appearance. 1977
House Hearings, supra note 19, at 287 (statement of Charles Ruff, Watergate Special Prosecutor).
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inside the room. By keeping counsel outside the situation is significantly
improved. The witness does not have the pressure of knowing that the person
sitting by his side might betray his confidence and reveal his testimony to
outsiders. By eliminating this imminent source of apprehension, the witness
may provide a more complete testimony.' 3' Moreover, counsel outside the
room does not have access to the exact content of the witness' testimony.
Although he may have a general idea of the witness' cooperation with the
government, he does not know the precise nature of the witness' disclosures.
In addition to increasing the possibility of grand jury leaks, the presence of
counsel inside the grand jury may disrupt the proceedings. Allowing counsel
into the room, opponents argue, creates the possibility that lawyers will
"lawyer. 1 32 Even if a statute provides that the attorney cannot participate
other than by advising his client, many fear that the attorney will not remain
silent but will voice objections to certain questions. 133 Alternatively, even if
the attorney does not technically violate his obligation not to participate, he
might "whisper" advice to his client in a tone audible to the grand jurors. 134
In addition, opponents argue that without a judge present to exercise
immediate control, counsel's objections can not be ruled upon with any
speed. 13 5 The result would be unnecessary delay of the proceedings.
Advocates of allowing counsel into the grand jury respond that these fears
are unfounded. They argue that statutes which clearly state that the role of
the attorney in the grand jury is strictly limited to advising the witness, and
that disruptive counsel can be removed, would eliminate the possibility of
prolonged, disrupted grand juries. 136 Moreover, permitting counsel inside the
grand jury room, they argue, would actually result in more efficient use of
grand jury time because there would be no need for the witness to interrupt
his testimony by leaving the room to seek his counsel's advice.' 37 Although no
131. Id. at 725 (statement of Benjamin Civiletti, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Dep't of Justice).
132. E.g., Letter from Circuit Judges Mansfield, Mulligan, Timbers, Gurfein, Van Gmafel-
land, and Meskill to Rep. Eilberg (Aug. 2, 1977) (memorandum), reprinted in 1977 House
Hearings, supra note 19, at 267.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Advisory Comm. to Judicial Conference of the United States, Report on Criminal Rules
Concerning the Federal Grand Jury (Prel. Draft 1975), reprinted in 1976 House Hearings, supra
note 1, at 246.
136. Report of the Grand Jury Comm. of the ABA (1977), reprinted in 1977 House Hearings,
supra note 19, at 159. Advocates of permitting counsel into the grand jury room argue that
attorneys appear with witnesses before congressional committees and administrative agencies
without disrupting those proceedings. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 656 (statement of
Leon Friedman, representing the American Civil Liberties Union). The comparison, however, is
not a fair one. At such hearings a chairman, who conducts the meeting and keeps order, is
present. In the grand jury room, there is no chairman or judge to keep order. In the grand jury,
every time an objection is raised the proceeding has to be interrupted pending a ruling from the
presiding judge who is not present. Id. at 286 (statement of Edwin Miller representing National
District Attorneys Ass'n), 745 (statement of Benjamin Civiletti, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Dep't of Justice).
137. ABA Section of Criminal Justice, Report to the House of Delegates (1976), reprinted in
1977 House .Hearings, supra note 19, at 148; see Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
§ 340.3, Commentary at 604 (1975).
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exhaustive survey has been conducted, preliminary studies of those jurisdic-
tions that have allowed counsel into the grand jury indicate that the fears of
the opponents are exaggerated. The new procedure has resulted in little actual
disruption of the grand jury.' 38
In view of the considerable debate on the issue, it seems that counsel should
be present in the grand jury only in certain situations. In a jurisdiction like
New York that automatically grants immunity to witnesses, the right to
counsel inside the grand jury room should be extended only to those witnesses
who waive their immunity.' 39 In those jurisdictions that do not automatically
grant immunity, 140 the right should be extended to witnesses who have not
been granted immunity. If after the commencement of the grand jury proceed-
ing, the prosecutor decides to grant immunity to the witness, counsel should
then be required to leave the room.
This compromise proposal is desirable for several reasons. First, it creates a
laboratory condition in which legislators can observe whether counsel
obstructs the grand jury proceeding. If there is no interference, the right can
be extended to all witnesses. If counsel does unduly interfere, the experiment
can be halted. Second, in those jurisdictions that do not automatically grant
immunity, the prosecutor's desire to interrogate the witness free from interfer-
ence of counsel would work as an incentive to the prosecutor to grant
immunity to witnesses whom he did not plan to prosecute. The grant of
immunity to such witnesses is desirable because it creates an atmosphere in
which the witness, free from the threat of prosecution, will give candid and
honest testimony.
Finally, and most significantly, it gives added protection only to those
witnesses who need it most. The balancing of the investigative role of the
138. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 142 (statement of Richard Gerstein, representing
the ABA), 1574 (study conducted by Martin Belsky, counsel to the Subcomm- on Immigration,
Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary). The attorney general
of Arizona, however, reports that although counsel's presence has not disrupted that state's grand
juries, it has severely hampered their operations by aggravating the problems of
multiple representation. In his estimation, if all witnesses were permitted to be accompanied by
counsel inside the grand jury, the situation would become "intolerable." Id. at 794. Furthermore,
in Illinois' Cook County, where ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 112-4(b) (Supp. 1978) allows counsel for a
target of the investigation into the grand jury room, prosecutors have complained that certain
attorneys attempt to participate in the proceedings despite such prohibition in the statute. They
also report that attorneys attempt to advise witnesses in a "stage whisper" audible to the grand
jurors. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 19. at 725.
Prosecutors in the New York City area have reported that the new procedure a. running
smoothly. None of the five prosecutors contacted by this author reported any significant
problems. Interview with Sheldon Galfunt. Chief of Grand Jury Bureau of Queens County
District Attorney's Office in New York City (Jan. 2. 1979); Telephone Interview with Robert
Kaye, Chief of Grand Jury Bureau of Kings County District Attorney's Office (Mar- 10. 1979);
Telephone Interview with John McKenna, Chief of Grand Jury Bureau of Nassau County District
Attorney's Office (Mar. 19, 1979); Telephone Interview with Barbara Ryan, Chief of Grand Jury
Bureau of Bronx County District Attorney's Office (Mar. 19, 1979); Telephone Interview with
Thomas R. Sullivan, District Attorney of Staten Island (Mar. 19. 1979).
139. This, in fact, is the procedure in New York. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.52 tMcKinney
Supp. 1978-1979); see note 32 supra and accompanying text.
140. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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grand jury versus its protective role requires that added protection to wit-
nesses be granted only upon a strong showing of need. Although constitu-
tional considerations do not require that counsel be present in the room, in
order to protect against prosecutorial abuse, facilitate legal advice, and
eliminate the prejudicial effect of requiring the witness to leave the room to
confer with his attorney, counsel should be inside the room with the witness if
he is not protected by immunity. The witness without immunity needs
constant legal aid to grapple with the legal problems which may confront him.
Furthermore, the person who is the target of the investigation will be unable
to procure a grant of immunity if he testifies before a grand jury. In the
federal grand jury, the prosecutor will not grant immunity to a person whom
he intends to prosecute. In New York, where immunity is granted automat-
ically, the prosecutor will not subpeona any person whom he plans to
prosecute. Thus, if the person under suspicion wants to have the opportunity
to address the grand jurors, he will have to waive his immunity. 14 1 The
person who may ultimately be prosecuted needs the greatest protection from
abuse. Ironically, he is afforded the least protection. It is he who needs the
"guiding hand of counsel"' 142 at his side. It is he who should have counsel with
him in the grand jury room.
III. THE NEW YORK STATUTE: ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS
Under the New York statute a witness who has waived his immunity may
have counsel with him inside the grand jury while he testifies, 143 "The
attorney may advise the witness, but may not otherwise take any part in the
proceeding."' 44 If he abuses the privilege, the attorney may be removed by
the supervising court.
4
-
Although the statute does make it clear that an attorney may not interpose
objections on behalf of the witness,' 46 it does not set out with precision the
attorney's new role in the grand jury. In its brevity it also fails to deal with
corollary issues that may arise as a result of counsel's newly expanded role.
An examination of case law, the legislative history of the statute, and similar
141. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.50(9)(b) (McKinney 1971).
142. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970).
143. The New York statute provides: "1. Any person who appears as a witness and has
signed a waiver of immunity in a grand jury proceeding, has a right to an attorney as provided In
this section. Such a witness may appear with a retained attorney, or if he is financially unable to
obtain counsel, an attorney who shall be assigned by the superior court which impaneled the
grand jury. Such assigned attorney shall be assigned pursuant to the same plan and in the snme
manner as counsel are provided to persons charged with crime pursuant to section seven hundred
twenty-two of the county law. 2. The attorney for such witness may be present with the witness
in the grand jury room. The attorney may advise the witness, but may not otherwise take any
part in the proceeding. 3. The superior court which impaneled the grand jury shall have the same
power to remove an attorney from the grand jury room as such court has with respect to an
attorney in a courtroom. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.52 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
144. Id. § 190.52(2).
145. Id. § 190.52(3).
146. Compare N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.52 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) with Kan. Stat.
§ 22-3009(2) (1974) ("Counsel for any witness may be present while the witness is testifying and
may interpose objections on behalf of the witness.').
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statutes in other states, however, provides some guidance as to the appropri-
ate construction of the New York statute.
A. Scope of Attorney-Client Discussions
The leading case on right to counsel in the New York grand jury prior to the
statutory change permitting counsel inside the room was People v. lan-
niello. 147 In Ianniello, the court of appeals stated that absent a need to
discuss legal matters with an attorney, such as the applicability of a testimo-
nial privilege or the scope of transactional immunity, a grand jury witness
has no right to be "represented" by counsel. 48 Thus, when a witness dearly
understood all of the legal issues which confronted him but wanted strategic
advice in answering "embarrassing questions," he could not leave the grand
jury room to consult with counsel. 149 Under this reasoning, when counsel is
inside the grand jury room pursuant to the new statute, attorney-client
discussions should be limited to legal advice.
Although the new statute does not distinguish between legal and nonlegal
advice, its legislative history supports the contention that discussions
pertaining to nonlegal matters should not be permitted. In addition to
facilitating legal assistance, the purpose of the statute is to help curb pros-
ecutorial abuse.' 5 0 Neither purpose is furthered by allowing counsel to advise
the witness in nonlegal matters. If anything, such discussions may frustrate
the grand jury from conducting an orderly, effective investigation. They
create the possibility that the witness will rely on the attorney for answers and
merely repeat the attorney's suggested responses. 15' Furthermore, extended
discussions may be distracting to the grand jurors. Thus, in those instances
where it is clear that the witness is seeking nonlegal advice from his attorney,
the discussions should be prohibited.
B. Unavailability of Counsel
The Massachusetts statute permitting counsel in the grand jury provides
that witnesses may not refuse to testify if their lawyers are unavailable.'
5 2
That provision was added at the insistence of prosecutors to prevent de-
lays. 1 53 Other jurisdictions take a less drastic approach. The Minnesota
statute, for example, provides that an attorney may be present in the room
provided that "his presence can be secured without unreasonable delay in the
147. 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968).
148. Id. at 424, 235 N.E.2d at 443, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
149. Id. at 426, 235 N.E.2d at 444, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
150. A precursor of the present bill was included in the New York State Assembly Code
Committee report, Abuse of Power, supra note 1, dealing with prosecutorial abuse and proposed
remedies. At hearings held by that committee in 1977 it was repeatedly argued that the presence of
counsel would help control prosecutorial abuse. E.g., New York Hearings, supra note 28, at 183
(statement of William Gallagher, representing New York City Legal Aid Society); see Belacosa,
Practice Commentary, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.52 at 84 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
151. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
152. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 277, § 14A (Milchie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978).
153. N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
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grand jury proceedings.' 54 The comparable Kansas statute gives a witness
three days to obtain counsel.' 55
The New York statute is silent as to the unavailability of counsel. Simi-
larly, the legislative history does not address this situation. Absent a provision
dealing with the issue, the Minnesota approach seems most meritorious.
Although unavailability of counsel should not result in automatic loss of the
right to counsel, delay to the proceeding should not be tolerated absent a good
reason.
C. Note Taking in the Grand Jury Room
Since the inception of the new statute, some lawyers have taken advantage
of their opportunity to be inside the grand jury room by taking notes of their
witnesses' testimony.'5 6 Some prosecutors, alarmed by the possibility of a
breach in the secrecy of the grand jury, have objected to this procedure.1",
Indeed, at least one district attorney's office instituted the practice of
confiscating these notes when the witness and his attorney left the room. 158
This procedure was challenged in In re Grand Jury ex rel. Riley. 159 In Riley,
the New York Supreme Court ruled that note taking is permissible and that,
therefore, the notes could not be confiscated.' 6 The court found that such
activity is permitted as part of an attorney's right "to advise" the witness, 161
The decision is most disappointing because the history of the statute reveals
that note taking does not help fulfill any of the purposes which the enactors of
the statute had in mind, and, if anything, frustrates those purposes.
The new statute itself makes no mention of note taking. It merely states that
the attorney "may advise the witness, but may not otherwise take any part in
the proceeding.' ' 162 A simple reading of the statute would indicate that the
attorney's role is to advise the witness and nothing else. Likewise, the
legislative history does not deal with note taking per se. It does reveal,
however, that the draftors of the statute designed it to serve two purposes.
First, they wished to assist the witness before a grand jury to deal with legal
problems that may confront him.' 63 Second, and foremost, they wanted to
stem the prosecutorial abuse that had blossomed during Maurice Nadjari's
154. Minn. R. Crim. P. 18.04.
155. Kan. Stat. § 22-3009 (1974).
156. Interview with Sheldon Galfunt, Chief of Grand Jury Bureau of Queens County District
Attorney's Office, in New York City (Jan. 2, 1979).
157. Id.
158. In re Grand Jury ex rel. Riley, - Misc. 2d -' , 414 N.Y.S.2d 441, 441 (Sup. Ct.
1979); Interview with Sheldon Galfunt, Chief of Grand Jury Bureau of Queens County District
Attorney's Office, in New York City (Jan. 2, 1979).
159. - Misc. 2d __, __, 414 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
160. Id. at __, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
161. Id. at__, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 443. The Court said that note taking serves a useful purpose
by helping a witness to avert committing perjury. Id. at _, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 443. But see
People v. Doe, 95 Misc. 2d 175, 176-77, 406 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
162. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.52(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); quoted at note 143
supra.
163. Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 447, N.Y. Laws (June 19, 1978), reprinted
in [1978] N.Y. Laws 1820 (McKinney).
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tenure as Special Prosecutor. ' 64 As one judge stated, "situations . . . arose in
which a prosecutor might, inadvertently or otherwise, overstep the legitimate
bounds of his office to the detriment of a witness."'' 65
Neither purpose is furthered by permitting counsel to take notes inside the
grand jury. In New York, the testimony of each wilness, plus an), legal
instructions or advice from the court or prosecutor, is recorded by a court
stenographer. 1 66 As a result, there is no need for an attorney to take notes to
substantiate any allegations of prosecutorial abuse. Nor will note taking help
the attorney in providing legal assistance to the witness. The Janniello court
listed three types of legal decisions where there is a legitimate need to receive
aid from counsel: (1) whether to assert or waive a privilege; (2) whether to
refuse to answer questions having no bearing on the subject of the investiga-
tion; and (3) whether to divulge privileged conversations. 1 67 The ability to
take notes does not noticeably enhance the attorney's capacity to advise on
any of these matters.
Furthermore, even if note taking would help the attorney advise the
witness in these or other legal matters, ' 68 it would only justify his taking notes
during the witness' testimony. It would not permit the attorney to keep the
notes after the witness had completed his testimony. If the attorney desires to
keep his notes after the witness finishes testifying he may have one of two
motives. Either he wants the notes to help him prepare for trial in case an
indictment is issued against his client or he plans to divulge in detail the
content of the witness' testimony to some outside party. The possibility that
the attorney may divulge the testimony to some outside party and thereby
stain the reputation of one of the parties under investigation, aid a putative
defendant to orchestrate a defense, or otherwise disrupt the investigation of
the grand jury, is more than sufficient reason to prohibit note taking. If the
attorney desires the notes to prepare for trial he can get a complete transcript
of the testimony from the court when an indictment is issued. 169 Given the
possible mischievous use of such notes, the attorney should not be permitted
to keep any notes when he leaves the grand jury room.
D. Multiple Representation
As a commercial center, New York is particularly prone to both organized
crime and white collar crime. The presence of an attorney inside the grand
164. A precursor of the present bill appears in a study of prosecutorial abuse and proposed
remedies prepared by the Codes Committee of the New York State Assembly, Abuse of Power,
supra note 1, at 82. In that study an entire chapter is devoted to Maurice Nadjari's abuse of his
powers as New York State Special Prosecutor. Id. at 47-71.
165. In re Grand Jury ex rel. Riley, - Misc. 2d .... 414 NYS.2d 441, 442 (Sup.
Ct. 1979).
166. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
167. 21 N.Y.2d at 424-25, 235 N.E.2d at 443, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69
168. See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
169. People v. Fitzgerald, 89 TMisc. 2d 243, 391 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (defendant is
entitled to minutes of his grand jury testimony even if the testimony has no relation to the
pending indictment); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 240.2001) (McKinney 1971); see note so supra and
accompanying text.
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jury investigating these crimes raises a particularly acute problem. As noted
above, in these situations the possibility exists that the attorney may leak the
witness' testimony. In recognition of this possibility, Colorado, which permits
counsel inside the grand jury room, prohibits an attorney who enters the
grand jury to represent more than one witness in that proceeding. ' 7 0 Although
there have been constitutional challenges to this type of restriction, the highest
courts of two states have found that prohibitions against multiple representa-
tion of grand jury witnesses is a constitutionally permissible limitation on the
right to counsel. 17 ' These courts have ruled that the right of a witness to be
represented before a grand jury by counsel of his own choosing is not an
absolute right. Consequently, it may be impaired upon a showing of an
overriding state interest such as effective grand jury investigation. 7 2
The New York statute does not address the problem of multiple representa-
tion.173 It is suggested, however, that the supervising judge of a grand jury
should not permit multiple representation if the prosecutor presents sufficient
evidence of a conflict of interest. Although the judge deciding whether to bar
multiple representation in a particular case should consider the financial
consequences of seperate representation, his primary concern should be to
preserve the grand jury's ability to investigate thoroughly without fear of
leaks to outside parties. Furthermore, to prevent attorneys from leaking grand
jury testimony, whether in multiple representation situations or otherwise, all
attorneys entering the grand jury should be required to take an oath not to
divulge any of the witness' testimony to outside parties.
E. Objectionable Questioning
The new statute provides no procedure for an attorney to air a legitimate
objection to the question asked of his client. In Bronx County, Judge
Kapelman has issued a memorandum to grand juries stating that an attorney
may not speak to individual grand jurors, the prosecutor, or the panel as a
whole.' 7 4 At least in the Bronx, therefore, an attorney cannot communicate
any objection to the prosecutor. Queens County takes a different approach. In
Queens, if an attorney finds the prosecutor's question objectionable he is
permitted to approach the prosecutor and discuss the matter quietly with him
170. Col. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-204(4)(d) (Supp. 1977) provides: "No attorney shall be permitted
to provide counsel in the grand jury room to more than one witness in the same criminal
investigation, except with the permission of the grand jury."
171. People v. J.L., - Colo. -, 580 P.2d 23 (1978); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341
A.2d 896 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976). See also In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th
Cir. 1976). For discussions of court rulings on multiple representation, see Note, Supervising
Multiple Representation of Grand Jury Witnesses, 57 B.U. L. Rev. 544 (1977); Note, Attorney
Disqualification at the Grand Jury, 37 La. L. Rev. 1224 (1977); Baker, Multiple Representation
Issue Comes to the Fore with Pirillo, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 9, 1978, at 28.
172. People v. J.L., - Colo. -, -, 580 P.2d 23, 27-28 (1978); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa.
511, 521, 341 A.2d 896, 901 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
173. Although the legislative history reveals that there was deep concern for the problem,
e.g., New York Hearings, supra note 28 at 227-28 (statement of Paul Curran, former United
States Attorney), 63-64 (statement of Robert Morgenthau, District Attorney of Manhattan), the
present statute does not deal with the problem.
174. Memorandum from Judge Kapelman to Grand Juries of Bronx County (n.d.).
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and try to resolve the issue. 17 - The Queens approach seems to be the better
one. Under the informal Queens procedure, the prosecutor and the attorney
for the witness can resolve many evidentiary issues without interrupting the
proceeding and without confusing the grand jurors. If the problem is not
resolved, the witness can obtain a ruling on the issue from the supervising
judge. If the judge finds the question unobjectionable and the witness persists
in refusing to answer, he can then be held in contempt of court.17 6
F. Leaving the Grand Jury Room
The new statute does not indicate whether a witness may still leave the
grand jury room to discuss matters with his attorney in privacy. The issue can
arise when a witness, fearing that counsel's presence will create an impression
on the grand jurors that he has something to hide, decides to enter the grand
jury room alone. It can also arise when an attorney is defending two clients in
separate proceedings and is unavailable to enter the grand jury with one of his
clients.
In People v. J.L. ,177 the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the right to
consult with counsel inside the grand jury room precluded the right to consult
with counsel outside the room.' 7 8 The court reached its conclusion after
consideration of two factors. First, under the Colorado statute, the attorney
who enters the room is required to take an oath of secrecy and is prohibited
from representing more than one witness without grand jury permission. The
court argued that "the purposes to be served by the statute would be routinely
evaded if attorneys were permitted to choose to remain outside the grand jury
room." 179 Second, the purpose of the Colorado statute was not only to protect
the right of witnesses, but also to conserve the time of the grand jury.' 80 if
witnesses would be allowed to leave the room the latter purpose would be
frustrated.
In New York, no such issues are currently present. The statute neither
prohibits multiple representation nor requires attorneys entering the grand
jury to take an oath of secrecy. Therefore, under the present statute, in New
York, the statutory purposes would not be frustrated if the attorney remains
outside the room to consult with a witness. 18 Nor is time a factor under the
New York statute. The legislative history of the statute indicates that its
enactors, unlike the court in J.L., believed that the presence of an attorney in
the grand jury room might elongate the proceeding. 182 This was justified,
175. Interview with Sheldon Galfunt, Chief of Grand Jury Bureau of Queens County District
Attorney's Office, in New York City (Jan. 2, 1979).
176. N.Y. Jud. Law § 750 (McKinney 1975); N.Y. Penal Law § 215.51 (McKinney 1975).
177. - Colo. -, 580 P.2d 23 (1978).
178. Id. at -, 580 P.2d at 25-26.
179. Id. at -, 580 P.2d at 26.
180. Id.
181. If, however, limitations were placed on multiple representation and an oath of secrecy
was required of attorneys entering the room, as suggested above, see note 174 supra and
accompanying text, then the Colorado court's analysis would be applicable in New York.
182. Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 447, N.Y. Laws (June 19, 1978), reprinted
in [1978] N.Y. Laws 1820 (McKinney).
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however, as an expense of protecting the rights of witnesses. 183 Therefore, it
is consistent with the spirit of the New York law to allow a witness to consult
with his attorney outside the room even if it will delay the proceeding.
The language of the statute also warrants the same conclusion. The statute
provides that a witness who has waived his immunity "has a right to an
attorney . . . [who] may be present with the witness in the grand jury
room."'1 84 The use of the permissive term "may" in the latter part of the
statute indicates that use of counsel inside the room is at the witness'
option. 18-5
CONCLUSION
The decision to permit counsel inside the grand jury room requires a
delicate balancing of conflicting interests. Attorneys allowed inside the grand
jury room must be careful to act as advisers not advocates. Nevertheless, the
presence of counsel inside the grand jury room will be beneficial to both the
grand jury and the witnesses testifying before it. The grand jury will benefit
because the presence of vigilant counsel would help to check prosecutorial
abuse. The witness will benefit because he will have the capable assistance of
counsel and he will not have to interrupt his testimony and leave the room for
advice. The linchpin of the success of the legislation, however, lies in the
performance of counsel. The assumption of an adversarial role by counsel will
result in tremendous detriment to the investigative role of the grand jury.
Jay Fenster
183. Id.
184. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.52 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
185. See People v. J.L.., - Colo. at - 580 P.2d at 30 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
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